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1 Introduction
Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969) and Sen (1973) have provided the basic framework within
which the modern approach to the measurement of inequality has developed. This approach
explicitly endows measures of inequality with a normative interpretation. This is done by
deriving inequality indices from social welfare functions defined on income distributions.
Each index so derived inherits the distributional judgements embodied in the social welfare
function from which it is derived. A reduction in inequality results in an increase in social
welfare provided mean incomes remain unchanged.
Since the underlying social welfare functions are supposed to be ordinal, the derived
measures of inequality are also ordinal. Hence, they can be used only to compare levels of
inequality associated with the income distributions of, say, two countries, or of the same
country at two points of time. However, it is also of considerable interest to ask questions
such as “Has country A been more successful than country B in reducing inequality over
the last decade?” A related but slightly different task is to compare the change in social
welfare in country A to that of country B during a given period of time. Since the two
countries may have a large difference in the rates of growth and since social welfare depends
both on the size and the distribution of the cake, it may, in fact, be more appropriate to
focus on comparisons of changes in social welfare. While this is the focus of this paper, we
will discuss briefly how to address the issue of comparing changes in the level of inequality.
A comparison of changes in levels of social welfare require us to step out of the ordinal
framework since the ranking of differences of welfare is not preserved under ordinal trans-
formations of the welfare function. That is why we assume in this paper that the social
welfare function has cardinal significance. This allows us to define a measure, V , of the
change in social welfare between two income distributions, say x0 and x1. Furthermore, it
is meaningful to compare levels of V (x0, x1) and V (y0, y1).
Having defined the measure of welfare change, V , our purpose is two-fold. First, we
specify axioms or properties of V and characterize a class of these welfare change measures.
This class of measures corresponds to the difference in welfare levels of two distributions,
where the welfare function itself belongs to the class of generalized Gini indices. Our proof
closely follows that of Weymark (1981), the principal difference being that our axioms are
imposed on the measure of welfare change rather than on the welfare function. Our axioms
are also slightly different allowing for a shorter proof.
Our second purpose leads perhaps to our main contribution. The generalized Gini wel-
fare functions constitute the entire class of linear functions of individual incomes satisfying
the strict version of the transfer principle that requires welfare (and hence equality) to go
up when there is a transfer of income from a rich person to someone who is poorer. Of
course, the comparison of levels of welfare change can vary depending on which member of
the class is used. Since there are no firm ethical reasons for preferring one generalized Gini
function over another, it may not always be possible to arrive at unambiguous comparisons.
So, we ask the question whether it is possible to define a dominance condition which if sat-
isfied guarantees that the comparison of levels of welfare change give the same answer for
all the generalized Gini welfare functions. This question has, of course, been asked in the
context of inequality of income distributions. Following Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969),
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Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973) proved the most general such result by showing that
if two distributions have the same mean income, then the social welfare associated with
income distribution x is higher than that of y according to any S-concave welfare function
if and only if the Lorenz curve of x lies everywhere above that of y. Thus, there is a precise
dominance result for equality levels that corresponds to the class of S-concave welfare func-
tions. Shorrocks (1983) and Kakwani (1984) independently extended this result so as to
be able to compare welfare levels of income distributions which do not have the same mean
incomes. They scaled up the Lorenz curve of an income distribution by its mean income
to obtain the generalized Lorenz curve, and showed that generalized Lorenz dominance of
income distribution x over another distribution y also provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for unambiguous welfare comparisons. That is, x has higher social welfare than
y for all increasing and S-concave welfare functions if and only if its generalized Lorenz
curve lies everywhere above that of y.
We too use generalized Lorenz curves in our analysis of comparisons of welfare change,
but adapt them for our purpose. Consider any income distribution x0 for a population of
size n where individual incomes have been ranked in increasing order, so that xi ≤ xi+1
for all i from 1 to n − 1. Then, the generalized Lorenz curve of x is obtained by plotting
the cumulative incomes of the lowest k income levels against each k for all k from 1 to
n. Suppose now that there are two pairs of income distributions (all of population size n)
indicating how income distributions have changed in countries A and B. Suppose also that
all individual incomes have been arranged in increasing order. Then, we compare the sums
of the cumulative differences between x0 and x1, and between y0 and y1. Put differently,
we focus not on the generalized Lorenz curves themselves, but on the sums of the vertical
differences between x0 and x1, and between y0 and y1. Our principal result is that the
welfare change between x0 and x1 is at least as large as that between y0 and y1 for all
generalized Gini differences if and only if the curve corresponding to the cumulative sums
of differences between x0 and x1 lies everywhere above that of the corresponding curve for
the y distributions.
Of course, this dominance is equivalent to second-order dominance of the difference
between the x vectors and the y vectors. We then ask whether first-order dominance of
the difference between the (ranked) x vectors over the difference between the (ranked)
y vectors will imply unambiguous welfare change comparisons for a larger class of welfare
functions. Clearly, this class would then contain the generalized Gini welfare functions since
first-order dominance implies second-order dominance. However, we show the surprising
result that even when there is first-order dominance in this sense, the only class for which
unambiguous welfare comparisons are possible is the set of linear functions. So, once the
strict transfer principle is imposed, our result implies that first-order dominance does not
buy anything that second-order dominance does not already give us. This demonstrates
that unambiguous comparisons of welfare change are very hard to make.
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2 Measures of welfare change
Suppose that there are n ≥ 2 individuals in a society. A measure of welfare change is a
function V : R2n+ → R and we interpret V (x0, x1) as an indicator of the improvement (or
deterioration) associated with moving from last period’s income distribution x0 ∈ Rn+ to
the current distribution x1 ∈ Rn+. Our objective is to find a class of functions V that can
be expressed in terms of a difference in welfare levels. That is, we require V to possess the
following property.
Welfare difference compatibility. There exists a function W : Rn+ → R such that, for
all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+,
V (x0, x1) = W (x1)−W (x0). (1)
We use the following properties that are well-established in the context of welfare func-
tions and they continue to have strong intuitive appeal when formulated for a measure of
welfare change. The first of these is continuity.
Continuity. V is continuous.
The next property is a strict monotonicity condition. It requires that V is strictly
decreasing in x0 and strictly increasing in x1.
Strict monotonicity. (a) For all x0, x1, z0 ∈ Rn+, if z0i ≥ x0i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with at
least one strict inequality, then V (z0, x1) < V (x0, x1).
(b) For all x0, x1, z1 ∈ Rn+, if z1i ≥ x1i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with at least one strict
inequality, then V (x0, z1) > V (x0, x1).
It follows immediately that if V is continuous and strictly monotonic and a function W as
in (??) exists, this function W must be continuous and strictly increasing.
Positive linear homogeneity is another standard requirement for welfare functions that
can be expressed for a measure of welfare change.
Positive linear homogeneity. For all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all λ ∈ R++,
V (λx0, λx1) = λV (x0, x1).
Furthermore, we assume that V is anonymous, that is, V is invariant with respect to
permutations of the income vectors.
Anonymity. For all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all permutations pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n},
V
(
(x0pi(1), . . . , x
0
pi(n)), (x
1
pi(1), . . . , x
1
pi(n))
)
= V (x0, x1).
The function W of (??) must be anonymous as a consequence of the anonymity of V . This
is the case because, using (??), the anonymity of V requires
W
(
x1pi(1), . . . , x
1
pi(n)
)−W (x0pi(1), . . . , x0pi(n)) = W (x1)−W (x0)
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for all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all permutations pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}. Setting x0 =
(1, . . . , 1), this simplifies to
W
(
x1pi(1), . . . , x
1
pi(n)
)
= W (x1)
for all x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all permutations pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} so that W is anony-
mous.
The strict transfer principle (Pigou, 1912; Dalton, 1920) is an essential equity require-
ment. For any two income distributions x1, y1 ∈ Rn+, the distribution y1 is obtained
from x1 via a progressive transfer if there exist i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x1i < x1j and
ε ∈ (0, (x1j−x1i )/2] such that y1i = x1i+ε, y1j = x1j−ε and y1k = x1k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i, j}.
Strict transfer principle. For all x0, x1, y1 ∈ Rn+, if y1 is obtained from x1 via a progres-
sive transfer, then V (x0, x1) < V (x0, y1).
The function W satisfies the standard strict transfer principle if V satisfies the above
property. Suppose that y1 ∈ Rn+ is obtained from x1 ∈ Rn+ via a progressive transfer, and
let x0 ∈ Rn+ be arbitrary. By the strict transfer principle and (??), it follows that
W (x1)−W (x0) < W (y1)−W (x0)
so that W (x1) < W (y1) for all x1, y1 ∈ Rn+ such that y1 is obtained from x1 via a progressive
transfer.
Note that the conjunction of (??) and the strict transfer principle implies that, for all
x0, x1, y0 ∈ Rn+, if y0 is obtained from x0 via a progressive transfer, then the inequality
V (x0, x1) > V (y0, x1) must be true.
Our final axiom is an independence condition that is restricted to income distributions
in which all incomes are ranked from lowest to highest. Formally, the set of bottom-first-
ordered permutations of the elements of Rn+ is given by
B = {x ∈ Rn+ | x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn}.
The welfare function analogue of following property appears in Weymark (1981, p. 418).
Weak independence of income source. For all x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ B,
V (x0 + z, x1 + z) ≥ V (y0 + z, y1 + z) ⇔ V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1). (2)
This axiom implies that W has the corresponding property as defined in Weymark (1981).
Using (??), it follows that (??) is equivalent to
W (x1 + z)−W (x0 + z) ≥ W (y1 + z)−W (y0 + z) ⇔ W (x1)−W (x0) ≥ W (y1)−W (y0)
for all x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ B. Setting x0 = y0, this simplifies to
W (x1 + z) ≥ W (y1 + z) ⇔ W (x1) ≥ W (y1)
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for all x1, y1, z ∈ B, which is Weymark’s (1981) condition.
Let
A = {α ∈ Rn++ | α1 > . . . > αn}.
A welfare function W is a generalized Gini welfare function if there exists a parameter
vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ A such that, for all x ∈ Rn+,
W (x) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜i (3)
where x˜ ∈ B is a bottom-first-ordered permutation of x. Thus, the weights αi are assigned
to the positions in an income distribution, where higher incomes receive lower weights in
order to ensure that the resulting welfare function respects the strict transfer principle.
The corresponding generalized Gini measure of welfare change is given by
V (x0, x1) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜
1
i −
n∑
i=1
αix˜
0
i (4)
for all (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ . The measure of welfare change associated with the parameter vector
α ∈ A is denoted by Vα. The class of all generalized Gini measures of welfare change is
given by
VG = {Vα | α ∈ A}.
Because we restrict attention to anonymous measures of welfare and welfare change, it
involves no loss of generality to assume that x is bottom-first ordered.
3 Dominance properties
To simplify notation, we define
δi = x
1
i − x0i and γi = y1i − y0i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
for all bottom-first-ordered income distributions x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B. The following dom-
inance property is a welfare-change adaptation of the generalized Lorenz criterion; see
Shorrocks (1983).
Second-order dominance. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B, (x0, x1) second-order dominates
(y0, y1) if and only if
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Our objective is to derive a condition on any two pairs of distributions (x0, x1) and (y0, y1)
that will enable us to state that the welfare change between (x0, x1) is greater or smaller
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than the welfare change between (y0, y1) for all measures of welfare change in the class VG.
So, we want to rule out cases where there are two parameter vectors α, α′ ∈ A such that
Vα(x
0, x1) ≥ Vα(y0, y1) and Vα′(x0, x1) < Vα′(y0, y1).
The following lemma provides a condition that prevents such reversals.
Lemma 1. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B,
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG
if and only if
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . n} and for all α ∈ A. (5)
Proof. Sufficiency of (??) follows from the definition of the elements of VG.
To prove necessity, let Vα(x
0, x1) ≥ Vα(y0, y1) for some α ∈ A. Therefore, by definition
n∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ 0. (6)
Suppose there exists a k < n such that
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) < 0.
Together with (??), this implies
n∑
i=k+1
αi(δi − γi) ≥
k∑
i=1
αi(γi − δi).
Let c > 1 and define a vector αc ∈ A as follows. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
αci =
{
αi if i ≤ k,
1
c
αi if i > k.
Clearly, αc ∈ A for all c > 1, and there exists c∗ sufficiently large such that
n∑
i=1
αc
∗
i (δi − γi) < 0,
that is, Vαc∗ (y
0, y1) > Vαc∗ (x
0, x1). This shows that if (??) is not satisfied, then there are
two measures of welfare change in VG which differ in their ranking of the pairs (x0, x1) and
(y0, y1), a contradiction that completes the proof.
We prove one more lemma before stating our main result.
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Lemma 2. Let x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B and suppose that (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Then, for all α ∈ A and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ αk
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi).
Proof. Clearly, the claim is true for k = 1. By way of induction, suppose that it is true
for all k′ < k. Then it follows that
αk(δk − γk) +
k−1∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ αk(δk − γk) + αk−1
k−1∑
i=1
(δi − γi).
Hence,
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ αk
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi)
since αk−1 > αk because α ∈ A and
∑k−1
i=1 (δi − γi) ≥ 0 because (x0, x1) second-order
dominates (y0, y1).
We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B,
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG
if and only if (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Proof. Suppose first that (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1). Then, by definition,
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (7)
Take any α ∈ A. Then the inequality
α1(δ1 − γ1) ≥ 0
follows from setting k = 1 in (??) and the fact that α1 > 0. Suppose that, for some
K ∈ {2, . . . , n},
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
We want to show that
K∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ 0.
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By (??) and Lemma ??,
K∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ αK
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi) ≥ 0.
Since α ∈ A was chosen arbitrarily, this inequality together with Lemma ?? establishes
that V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG.
Now suppose that V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG. We need to show that (x0, x1)
second-order dominates (y0, y1). In view of Lemma ??, it is sufficient to prove that if (??)
is satisfied, then (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Pick any α ∈ A. Then,
k∑
i=1
αi(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Clearly, δ1 ≥ γ1 since α1 > 0. Let K ∈ {2, . . . , n} and assume that
k∑
i=1
(δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
Suppose that
K∑
i=1
(δi − γi) < 0.
Multiplying by αK > 0, we obtain
K∑
i=1
αK(δi − γi) < 0. (8)
Let ε ∈ R++ and define αε ∈ A as follows. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
αεi =
{
αK + (K − i)ε if i < K,
αi if i ≥ K.
From (??), we know that
K∑
i=1
αεi (δi − γi) ≥ 0 for all ε ∈ R++.
But (??) implies
lim
ε→0
K∑
i=1
αεi (δi − γi) = αK
K∑
i=1
(δi − γi) < 0,
a contradiction to (??) that completes the proof of the theorem.
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A comparison with the result obtained by Shorrocks (1983) illustrates the impact of con-
sidering welfare differences rather than welfare levels. Because of the linearity inherent in
difference comparisons, not all increasing and S-concave welfare functions have to agree in
order to obtain an equivalence result but only those among them that are linear—that is,
those corresponding to the generalized Ginis.
Thus, as established in the above theorem, welfare functions other than the generalized
Ginis cannot be employed in an equivalence result that involves our second-order dominance
condition. This raises the question of whether a more stringent dominance definition can
accommodate a more general class of functions. For instance, we may want to impose a
first-order dominance property for welfare differences, defined as follows. Again, we assume
that, without loss of generality, the income distributions x0, x1, y0, y1 are in B, and δi and
γi are defined as above.
First-order dominance. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B, (x0, x1) first-order dominates (y0, y1)
if and only if
δi − γi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because first-order dominance implies second-order dominance, the generalized Gini mea-
sures of welfare change are compatible with this dominance property. There may be addi-
tional measures that can be accommodated in the first-order case but, as illustrated below,
all of them must be based on linear measures as well.
Let F be a class of measures of welfare change. If the members of F are to be compatible
with the first-order dominance criterion, it must be the case that if (x0, x1) first-order
dominates (y0, y1), then
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ F
or, in terms of the underlying welfare functions W ,
W (x1)−W (x0) ≥ W (y1)−W (y0). (9)
Consider x1, y0 ∈ B and let x0 = y1 = (x1 + y0)/2, that is, the distributions x0 and y1 are
both equal to the arithmetic mean of x1 and y0. Therefore, by definition,
δi − γi = (x1i − x0i )− (y1i − y0i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because x0 = y1 = (x1 + y0)/2, (??) requires that
W (x1)−W (x0) = W (y1)−W (y0) ⇔ W (x1)−W (x0) = W (x0)−W (y0)
⇔ 2W (x0) = W (x1) +W (y0)
⇔ W
(
1
2
x1 +
1
2
y0
)
=
1
2
W (x1) +
1
2
W (y0),
a condition that requires W to be an increasing affine function within the bottom-first-
ordered subspace of Rn+. This, in turn, means that the associated measure of welfare
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change is linear. Because the only functions with that property other than the generalized
Ginis are such that the parameter vectors α do not respect the inequalities that define
membership in A, it follows that these additional functions fail to satisfy the strict transfer
principle. Thus, even this first-order dominance condition does not allow for measures
other than the generalized Ginis if this fundamental equity property is to be retained.
We conclude this section with an observation that follows from the above-stated results.
Consider the question of making similar unambiguous comparisons of changes in the level
of inequality, where the measure of inequality is derived from a social welfare function.
Take two pairs of income distributions (x0, x1) and (y0, y1) each with the same (positive)
mean income. Let
Z(x0, x1) = I(x1)− I(x0)
be a measure of inequality change, analogous to V . Suppose, moreover, that
I(x) = 1− xe
µ(x)
,
where µ(x) is mean income and xe is the equally-distributed-equivalent income correspond-
ing to the income distribution x and the welfare function W . That is, xe is implicitly
defined by
W (xe, . . . , xe) = W (x).
Let IG be the class of inequality measures that are derived from the class of generalized
Gini welfare functions, and let ZG be the set of measures of inequality change that represent
the difference of inequality levels where the inequality index is some member of IG. In view
of Theorem ??, the following result is immediate.
Theorem 2. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B with the same mean income,
Z(x0, x1) ≥ Z(y0, y1) for all Z ∈ ZG
if and only if (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Note that since we restrict the four distributions to have the same mean income, we
could also state the above theorem in terms of second-order dominance of the vertical
differences in the Lorenz curves.
4 A characterization
We conclude this paper by providing a characterization of the generalized Gini measures of
welfare change. There clearly is a strong resemblance to Weymark’s (1981) axiomatization
but some arguments in his proof can be simplified here because our list of axioms is slightly
different from his.
Theorem 3. A measure of welfare change V satisfies welfare difference compatibility, con-
tinuity, strict monotonicity, positive linear homogeneity, anonymity, the strong transfer
principle and weak independence of income source if and only if V is a generalized Gini
measure of welfare change with a corresponding generalized Gini welfare function W .
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Proof. That the generalized Gini measures of welfare change satisfy the axioms of the
theorem statement is straightforward to verify.
Conversely, suppose that V is a measure of welfare change satisfying the axioms. By
anonymity, it is sufficient to show that (??) and (??) are true for bottom-first-ordered
permutations of the requisite income distributions. As mentioned in the text, the welfare
function W (which exists as a consequence of welfare difference compatibility) inherits the
properties of continuity, strict increasingness, anonymity, the strict transfer principle and
weak independence of income source suitably formulated for welfare functions.
We now show that the restriction of W to bottom-first-ordered permutations must be
an increasing transformation of an increasing linear function. Because we assume that V
satisfies positive linear homogeneity, the argument used in the proof of Weymark’s (1981)
Theorem 3 can be simplified. To do so, we first prove that the restriction of any level set of
W to B is a convex set. Let z, z′ ∈ B be in the same level set of W so that W (z) = W (z′).
Using (??) and the positive linear homogeneity of V , it follows that
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ V (z, z′) = 0 ⇔ V (λz, λz′) = 0 ⇔ W (λz) = W (λz′)
for all λ ∈ R++. Letting θ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ W ((1− θ)z) = W ((1− θ)z′). (10)
Adding θz to both (1− θ)z and (1− θ)z′, weak independence of income source implies that
W ((1− θ)z) = W ((1− θ)z′) ⇔ W (θz + (1− θ)z) = W (z) = W (θz + (1− θ)z′)
and, combined with (??), we obtain
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ W (z) = W (θz + (1− θ)z′)
for all z, z′ ∈ B in the same level set of W and for all θ ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the
requisite level set is convex. Because W is strictly increasing, it follows that the restriction
of W to B is an increasing transformation of a strictly increasing linear function. Thus,
there exist β1, . . . , βn ∈ R++ and an increasing function φ : R+ → R such that, for all
x ∈ B,
W (x) = φ
(
n∑
i=1
βixi
)
. (11)
By the strict transfer principle and because the elements of B are bottom-first-ordered, it
follows that β1 > . . . > βn. By anonymity,
W (x) = φ
(
n∑
i=1
βix˜i
)
for all x ∈ Rn+.
Using (??) and noting that, for any p, q ∈ R+, two distributions x and y can be chosen
so that
∑n
i=1 βix˜
0
i = p and
∑n
i=1 βix˜
1
i = q, positive linear homogeneity requires that
φ(λq)− φ(λp) = λ(φ(q)− φ(p)) (12)
11
for all p, q ∈ R+ and for all λ ∈ R++. Setting p > 0, q = 0 and λ = 1/p in (??), it follows
that
φ(0)− φ(1) = (φ(0)− φ(p))/p
and, solving for φ(p), we obtain
φ(p) = (φ(1)− φ(0))p+ φ(0) = γp+ δ
where γ = φ(1) − φ(0) is positive because φ is increasing and δ = φ(0) is a real number.
Therefore, φ is an increasing affine function and, setting αi = γβi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it
follows that α1 > . . . > αn and
W (x) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜i
for all x ∈ Rn+. Using welfare difference compatibility, we obtain
V (x0, x1) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜
1
i −
n∑
i=1
αix˜
0
i
for all (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ .
5 Concluding remarks
In order to establish a dominance criterion that allows for welfare changes to be compared
across societies with different population sizes, one possible approach consists of replicating
the requisite societies and employing the dominance criterion that corresponds to the larger
population. Specifically, if we have pairs of distributions (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ and (y0, y1) ∈ R2m+
where n 6= m, we can consider an m-fold replication of (x0, x1) and an n-fold replication
of (y0, y1) and apply the dominance criterion for population size nm to the replicated dis-
tributions. Of course, implicit in such a procedure—which is also suggested by Shorrocks
(1983)—is some suitable notion of a principle of population, ensuring that such replications
do not distort welfare-change-relevant features of the original distributions. This observa-
tion leads us to the single-parameter Ginis, which are characterized by Donaldson and
Weymark (1980) by means of the principle of population. A similar variable-population
result that employs a recursivity property characterizes the single-series Ginis; see Bossert
(1990). In analogy to our characterization that parallels Weymark’s (1981) axiomatiza-
tion, these variable-population extensions can be adjusted to our setting so as to apply to
measures of welfare change.
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